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YOU'RE SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGE: SEXUAL
FAVORITISM AND THE WORKPLACE
Paige I. Bernick'
On October 1, 2009, late-night host, David
Letterman, admitted on the Late Night with David
Letterman Show ("Late Night"), "I have had sex with
women who work for me on this show." 2 Although the
employees who engaged in the sexual affairs affirmed that
the relationships were consensual, other Late Night staff
members sustained indirect harm by their actions.
A former female writer for the show, Nell Scovell,
published an opinion piece about Letterman's sexual
relationships for Vanity Fair entitled "Letterman and Me."
3
In 1990, Scovell joined the writing staff as the second
female ever hired by Late Night.4 It was her dream job--
she moved across the country from Los Angeles to New
York to be a part of the team.5 However, she eventually
perceived her working environment as intimidating for a
female writer. As Scovell explained:
Did Dave hit on me? No. Did he pay me
enough extra attention that it was noted by
J.D. Candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, 2011. A.B.,
History, Princeton University, 2008. Thank you to Professor Jeffrey
Hirsch for his advice and guidance as well as the Tennessee Journal of
Law and Policy Board and Staff for their time and energy editing this
Policy Note. I would also like to thank my parents for all of their
support and encouragement.
2 Bill Carter, Letterman Extortion Raises Questions for CBS, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at Al; see also Bill Carter, Letterman Reveal
Extortion Attempt Over His Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B4.
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another writer? Yes. Was I aware of
rumors that Dave was having sexual
relationships with female staffers? Yes.
Was I aware that other high-level male
employees were having sexual relationships
with female staffers? Yes. Did these female
staffers have access to information and
wield power disproportionate to their job
titles? Yes. Did that create a hostile work
environment? Yes. Did I believe these
female staffers were benefiting
professionally from their personal
relationships? Yes. Did that make me feel
demeaned? Completely.
6
Ultimately, Scovell walked away from her dream job
within a few months of starting.
7
Scovell's account is a prime example of sexual
favoritism and why it is relevant in today's workplace.
Sexual favoritism describes a situation where a supervisor
bestows benefits, promotions, or disproportional r ower to
an employee, who he or she is sexually involved. Sexual
favoritism primarily affects women in the workplace and
places an obstacle for women to obtain respect at their jobs.
This Note will address the past and future of sexual
favoritism law as well as potential improvements in the law
to protect more employees in the workplace. Part I will
cover the background of sexual favoritism law; Part II will
discuss sexual favoritism law at its current state; and Part
III will forecast the future of sexual favoritism law and how
it can improve. Ultimately, sexual favoritism law does not
6id.
7id.
8 See generally Mary Kate Sheridan, Just Because It's Sex Doesn't
Mean It's Because of Sex: The Need for New Legislation to Target
Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 379, 383-85 (2007).
2
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provide sufficient protection to employees and should
expand in order to fulfill its purpose.
I. Background
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
sex discrimination concerning terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.9  Sex discrimination occurs
when an employer differentiates on the basis of sex in
making employment decisions, where sex is not a pre-
requisite for the job.10 Sexual harassment is currently a
violation of §703 in Title VII, sex discrimination."
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, set forth
guidelines for determining sexual harassment, including
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitutes sexual harassment when submission to or
rejection of this conduct explicitly or implicitly affects an
individual's employment, unreasonably interferes with an
individual's work performance or creates an intimidating,
hostile or offensive work environment.
12
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); see also Toscano v. Nimmo,
570 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (D.C. Del. 1983). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
states that: "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's..
• sex .....
10 See Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (2009).
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). The exact language of the code is as
follows:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1)
3
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Under the EEOC guidelines, a sexual harassment claim
may present either as quid pro quo or a hostile work
environment. 13 Quid pro quo discrimination occurs in two
possible situations. First, harassment can occur when a
person is subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and/or other verbal or physical sexual
conduct.1 4  Second, it can also occur if an employee's
submission to sexual conduct is explicitly or implicitly
required in an employer's employment decision-making
process.
1 5
A hostile work environment claim comes from
judicial decisions and EEOC policies in the past that hold
that an employee retains the right to work in an atmosphere
free from discrimination based on intimidation, ridicule, or
insult.16  The sexual harassment must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working
submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
13 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a).
14 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a); see generally Stephen Dacus, Note, Miller v.
Department of Corrections: The Application of Title VII to
Consensual, Indirect Employer Conduct, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 835
(2006).
15 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
16 See Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive
Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified 29
C.F.R. pt. 1604.11); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1985).
4
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environment." 17 When determining the degree of sexual
harassment needed to create an abusive working
environment, a totality of the circumstances test is
utilized. 8
Sexual favoritism emerges as a subset of sexual
harassment law. Instead of a first-person sexual
harassment claim, a supervisor favors one employee or
some employees sexually and discriminating against others
through that preference, thus creating a third-person claim.
The EEOC guidelines provide a cause of action based on
sexual favoritism: "Where employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual's submission
to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex
discrimination against other persons who were qualified for
but denied that employment opportunity or benefit."'
9
1. Divergent Views on Sexual Favoritism
In the mid 1980s, two federal cases, King v.
Palmer2° and DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical
Center2 , reached different conclusions on sexual
favoritism claims.
In King, a female nurse, Mabel King was employed
at the District of Columbia Department of Corrections.
22
When King applied for a promotion, her request was
rejected because another candidate had already been
preselected.23 The preselected employee was romantically
involved with their supervisor, the Chief Medical Officer.
24
17 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
" Id. at 69.
19 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (g).
20 King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2 1 DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1986).
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King sued the employer for unlawfully denying a
promotion and for creating a discriminatory work
environment.25 The District of Columbia Circuit court held
"unlawful sex discrimination occurs whenever sex is for no
legitimate reason a substantial factor in the
discrimination." 26  The court found that King's
circumstantial evidence of the employee and supervisor
sexual relationship (including long lunches, preferential
treatment and physical contact at work2 7) met the burden of
persuasion for a Title VII sexual discrimination claim.
28
However, a few months later, the Second Circuit
determined in DeCintio "that sexual relationships between
coworkers should not be subject to Title VII scrutiny, so
long as they are personal, social relationships. ' 29  In
DeCintio, seven physical therapists brought a claim against
their employer for being disqualified for a promotion to an
Assistant Chief position.30  The supervisor made a
requirement that the promoted individual must be
registered by the National Board of Respiratory
Therapists.31 However, the only therapist considered for
the position with the requisite registration was the
supervisor's girlfriend, Jean Guagenti, and she ultimately
secured the job.32
The dispositive issue in this case examined whether
"'discrimination on the basis of sex' encompasses disparate
treatment premised not on one's gender, but rather on a
romantic relationship between an employer and a person
preferentially hired., 33 The court refused to expand the
25 Id. at 878-79.
16 Id. at 880.
27 Id. at 879.
28d. at 882-83.
29 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.




33 Id. at 306 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1982)).
6
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 147
meaning of "sex" for Title VII purposes to include sexual
liaisons and sexual attractions after determining that this
definition was "overbroad" and "wholly unwarranted.,
34
Thus, a split emerged among district courts on
whether to include sexual favoritism claims under Title
VII.
2. EEOC Policy Guidance Memo Reconciles Divergent
Views
On January 12, 1990, the EEOC issued a policy
memo concerning its stance on employer liability for sexual
favoritism in the workplace. 35 Although the policy memo
is non-binding on judicial decisions, it provides a
persuasive framework for how to look at sexual favoritism
claims in the context of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(g). 36 In the
policy memo, the EEOC has described three situations of
sexual favoritism and what forms are actionable.
37
First, isolated instances of sexual favoritism are not
actionable under Title VII.38 As the policy memo explains,
although a single episode of sexual favoritism toward an
employee is unfair, it equally discriminates against men
and women because both parties are disadvantaged
equally. 39  Isolated sexual favoritism is exemplified in
DeCintio, where the supervisor's preference for his one
girlfriend results in her promotion.
40
34 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
35 EEOC, N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY
UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (Jan. 12, 1990), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (hereinafter
"EEOC Policy Guidance"]. The policy memorandum was approved by
present day Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, while he was
chairperson of the EEOC.
36 Dacus, supra note 14 at 842.
37 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 DeCintio. 807 F.2d at 308.
7
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Second, sexual favoritism based on an implicit quid
pro quo claim may be actionable under Title VII. In this
situation, female employees with appropriate qualifications
may be overlooked or discriminated against because they
do not submit to sexual harassment actions.4' However, in
many situations, employees lack verifiable proof that
sexual conduct was a condition for an employment benefit
or promotion.42 For example an employer or supervisor
may only express interest in one employee, and only coerce
that employee for sexual activity. 43 In that situation, "both
women and men who were qualified for but were denied
the benefit would have standing to challenge the favoritism
on the basis that they were injured as a result of the
discrimination leveled against the employee who was
coerced.44
The EEOC explained the coerced single employee
position through Toscano v. Nimmo.4 5 In Toscano, the
court found a Title VII claim where sexual favors were a
condition for receiving a promotion.46 Although the
employee receiving preferential treatment engaged in a
consensual relationship with the supervisor, the fact that the
supervisor solicited female employees on the phone,
bragged about his sexual relations with subordinates and
engaged in sexually suggestive behavior at work provided
enough circumstantial evidence that sexual favors were a
condition for benefits at the place of employment.47
Third, widespread sexual favoritism may create a
cause of action for hostile environment harassment. 4 8 If
sexual favoritism extensively pervades in the place of




4' Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1199-01.
46Id. at 1200.
47 Id. at 1200-01.
48 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
8
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employment, "both male and female colleagues who do not
welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII regardless of whether
any objectionable conduct is directed at them and
regardless of whether those who were granted favorable
treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. ' 49  The
policy behind the action is to eradicate the implicit message
that women are "sexual playthings" and the only way to get
ahead in the workplace requires engaging in sexual
conduct.
50
The EEOC presented Broderick v. Ruder5 1 as the
prototype widespread sexual favoritism case.52  In
Broderick, a female attorney at the Securities and Exchange
Commission brought a sexual discrimination action against
her employer.53 She alleged that two of her supervisors
engaged in sexual relationships with their secretaries, who
received cash rewards, promotions and other job benefits.
54
In addition, another female staff attorney received a
promotion because a supervisor was attracted to her.
55
Finally, during an office party, a drunk supervisor untied
her sweater and kissed her as well as another female
56employee. The court found that the plaintiff had
"established a prima facie case of sexual harassment
because of having to work in a hostile work
environment." 57  The court noted that by bestowing
preferential treatment upon those who submitted to their
sexual advances, the supervisors "undermined plaintiffs
motivation and work performance and deprived plaintiff,
49 id.
50 Id.
5' 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
52 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
53 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1270.
54 d. at 1274.
55 id.
56 Id. at 1273.
57 Id. at 1278.
9
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and other WRO female employees, of promotions and job
opportunities."58 Although the court in Broderick found a
hostile work atmosphere, the EEOC recognized this case as
an example of an implicit quid pro quo case because the
sexual favors also represent conditions for promotions.
59
II. Current State of Sexual Favoritism Law
Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case
concerning sexual favoritism, federal courts as well as state
courts addressed sexual favoritism since the EEOC Policy
Guidance issued in 1990. In a 2005 California Supreme
Court case, Miller v. Department of Corrections, two
female employees, Edna Miller and Frances Mackey, filed
a California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")
discrimination suit against their employer based on a sexual
favoritism theory. The plaintiffs allege that the
Department of Corrections chief deputy warden engaged in
sexual relationships with three other subordinate
coworkers. 62  These subordinate coworkers received
benefits from their relationship with the warden, including
one employee's promotion determined by her affair with
the warden instead of her qualifications.6 Plaintiff Miller
addressed one of the paramours about her relationship with
the warden, and the Rparamour locked Miller in her office
for a couple of hours.
The court found that the plaintiffs presented an
actionable claim under FEHA, and concluded that,
[A]lthough an isolated instance of favoritism
58 id.
'9 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
60 Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
61 Id. at 80.
62 Id. at 83.
63 Id. at 81.
64 Id. at 83-84.
10
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on the part of a supervisor toward a female
employee with whom the supervisor is
conducting a consensual sexual affair
ordinarily would not constitute sexual
harassment, when such sexual favoritism in
a workplace is sufficiently widespread it
may create an actionable hostile work
environment in which the demeaning
message is conveyed to female employees
that they are viewed by management as
''sexual playthings" or that the way required
for women to get ahead in the workplace is
to engage in sexual conduct with their
supervisors or the management.
65
The court upheld the EEOC policies on sexual favoritism,
separating a claim for "widespread" sexual favoritism from
"isolated" sexual favoritism.
Another 2005 case, Wilson v. Delta State
University, also addressed sexual favoritism in the
workplace.66 A former male university employee filed suit
against the university on a theory of preferential treatment
of a paramour.67 The paramour was promoted to a job that
was not publicized to the rest of the community.
68
However, the Fifth Circuit found that "paramour
favoritism" is not an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII. 69  Unlike Miller, this was a case of isolated
favoritism, and thus did not rise to the level of
"widespread" under the EEOC Policy Guidance.
61 Id. at 80.
66 Wilson v. Delta State Univ., 143 Fed. Appx. 611 (5th Cir. 2005).
671d. at 612.
681 Id. at 611.
69 M. at 614.
11
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III. The Future of Sexual Favoritism Law and How to
Improve It
1. The Future of Sexual Favoritism Law
The two latest significant sexual favoritism cases,
Miller and Wilson, who have adopted EEOC Policy
Guidance, demonstrate that the EEOC recommendations
are most likely here to stay.
70
A line between isolated favoritism and widespread
favoritism will remain, because sexual favoritism is based
upon sex discrimination. 71  The EEOC Policy Guidance
recommends that "[a]n isolated instance of favoritism
toward a "paramour" (or a spouse, or a friend) may be
unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men
in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for
reasons other than their genders (emphasis added). 72 In
other words, isolated instances of sexual favoritism are
based on a preference for a particular person, and therefore
the sexes are discriminated against equally. Moreover,
current federal case law suggests that isolated instances of
sexual favoritism do not give rise to a claim. 73 Thus, the
70 See generally Maureen S. Binetti, Romance in the Workplace: When
"Love" Becomes Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 153, 157-
163 (2007).
71 But see Susan J. Best, Comment, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of
Action Under a "Sex-Plus" Theory, 30 N. I11. U. L. Rev. 211, 231-32
(2009) (discussing the possibility of a sex-plus theory analysis in place
of a separation between isolated and widespread sexual favoritism).
72 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
73 See Schobert v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that if favoritism has the same impact on male and
female employees at work, then the claims were not cognizable under
Title VII); Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that that a single instance of preferential treatment based on a
consensual relationship between a supervisor and an employee was not
within the scope of Title VII's protections); Taken v. Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
12
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EEOC Policy Guidance and current law are set in not
extending a cause of action to only an isolated instance of
sexual favoritism.
Additionally, most courts continue to apply the
EEOC Policy Guidance in determining "widespread"
sexual favoritism claims. For example, Miller reflects the
trend of keeping with the EEOC Policy Guidance by
advocating that a hostile work environment occurs when
the sexual favoritism is widespread, even though the policy
was fifteen years old at the time.
74
However, it remains unclear how many instances of
sexual favoritism constitute "widespread." In Miller, one
supervisor engaged in three affairs with subordinates. 75 In
Broderick, multiple supervisors were involved in affairs
with subordinates.76 The EEOC Policy Guidance states
that one affair is not actionable. Could widespread occur at
two supervisors and one employee? Could widespread
occur at one supervisor and two employees? The current
law's use of "widespread" connotes a large quantity of
sexual favors, but offers limited guidance beyond multiple
occurrences.
2. How to Improve Sexual Favoritism Law
New legislation may identify objective criteria for a
sexual favoritism claim. Title VII protects against
discrimination "because of' sex as in gender and not sexual
conduct.77 Under the current sexual favoritism analysis set
out by the EEOC Policy Guidance and followed by courts,
a third-party employee must prove that the sexual
favoritism in a workplace amounted to an implicit quidpro
consensual romantic relationships do not qualify for relief under Title
VII because they are not based on any gender differences).74 Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.
75 Id. at 83.
76 Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
13
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quo claim and/or a hostile work environment claim.78 The
current law leaves out isolated instances of sexual
favoritism because the favoritism involved discriminates
equally between the genders-favoritism based on a
consensual romantic relationship. However, circumstances
arise creating an isolated instance severe enough to affect
the conditions of a workplace. Currently, the law focuses
on the quantity of the sexual favoritism rather than the
quality. Thus, new legislation, not under the traditional
context of Title VII "because of. . . sex" 79 language, would
better promote the EEOC's intent to stop adverse affects on
employment opportunity based on sexual conduct.
80
A claim for sexual favoritism should be available to
widespread or isolated, coerced or non-coerced conduct.
Current sexual favoritism law fails to cover a consensual
relationship that may be so outrageous-the paramour
receives a promotion, undue responsibilities, preferential
treatment, advantages, and the like beyond the paramour's
skill, experience or merit-that it may alter the conditions
of a coworker's environment.
For example, a secretary of an accounting executive
begins an intimate relationship with her boss. The
secretary completed a two-year associate's degree, and she
entered work force one year ago while employed at her
current position for one month. The executive, while
engaged in the intimate relationship, appoints the secretary
to an entry-level accountant's position, provides her an
office, and quadruples her salary. An entry-level
accountant position usually requires an individual complete
a four-year bachelor's degree program from an accredited
university or college and some internship/work experience.
The position typically pays only double what the secretaries
make. The paramour later receives a promotion to an
78 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
80 EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 35.
154
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executive position within six months. Coworkers perceive
the message that an employee must be involved in an
intimate relationship with the boss to receive benefits and
promotions. The mere existence of one consensual
relationship between a supervisor and employee can create
hostility in the workplace. 8 1  Yet under Title VII, a
coworker of the paramour cannot recover because the
intimate relationship is consensual and not because of
gender.
New legislation should focus on qualifying sexual
favoritism rather than quantifying instances of favoritism.
Designating an extreme isolated instance of sexual
favoritism as merely unfair and only three instances of
sexual favoritism as widespread is inconsistent with
reducing sexual favoritism in the workplace, which
adversely affects the employment opportunities of third
parties.
A model sexual favoritism law requires legislators
to develop a separate statute including the following
elements: (1) a cause of action not under Title VII, (2)
supervisor favoring a subordinate, (3) because of sexual
conduct, (4) which is severe or persuasive as to alter the
condition of the employee's employment and create a
hostile and/or abusive working environment.
First, the sexual favoritism claim would be
independent of Title VII. Although current sexual
favoritism law remains subset of sexual harassment under
Title VII, sexual harassment limits what conduct amounts
to sexual favoritism by excluding isolated instances and not
defining widespread. A new law would allow a finder of
fact to assess the quality of the sexual favoritism to
determine its severity. Additionally, lawmakers should
consider making sexual favoritism claim actionable by the
81 See Jennifer Bercovici, Note, The Workplace Romance and Sexual
Favoritism: Creating a Dialogue Between Social Science and the Law
of Sexual Harassment, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 183, 210 (2006).
15
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EEOC, similar to Title VII, which would help filter cases.
Second, the action must involve a supervisor and a
subordinate. The thrust of the sexual favoritism law
attempts removal of adverse employment opportunities
caused by sexual favoritism in the workplace. Actions such
as promotion, benefits, and other intangible rewards are
generally presented to employees by supervisors. The
claim does not apply to employees at the same level or
supervisors who do not give promotions, benefits and the
like to paramours.
Third, the claim must include favoritism because of
sexual conduct. The finder of fact will not look to see
employee discrimination because of their gender, but rather
if the employee is being discriminated against because of
the sexual conduct between the supervisor and employee.
Sexual conduct differentiates favoritism claim from a
sexual harassment claim.
Fourth, a claim must establish that the favoritism
reaches a severe or persuasive level as to alter the condition
of the employee's employment and create a hostile and/or
abusive working environment. This language derives from
the EEOC Policy Guidance concerning a hostile work
environment claim. The fact finder would evaluate the
severity of a claim. This can be done through objective and
subjective tests similarly used in current sexual harassment
analysis.
82
A reasonable person standard provides an objective
test to determine the severity of the favoritism. Thus, an
employee must first prove that a reasonable person, in the
employee's situation, would perceive the conduct as severe
or pervasive as to alter the condition of the employee's
employment and create a hostile and/or abusive working
environment. The factors for proving severity would
include the components from a sexual harassment claim
and the EEOC Policy Guidance: implicit message by
82 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
156
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actions of a supervisor, psychological harm, interfering
with work, frequency, and behavior. The touchstone factor
would be the implicit message that the supervisor's actions
convey onto the workplace.
Finally, the fact finder applies the subjective test:
whether the employee proved they perceive the conduct as
severe or pervasive as to alter the condition of the
employee's employment and create a hostile and/or abusive
working environment. The employee perception element
would use the same factors for considering severity of the
sexual favoritism as the reasonable person standard.
However, the reality is that new legislation may not
be feasible. In today's society, a majority of the population
spends a significant portion of the week at work. The
workplace is natural meeting place for potential mates.
Romances between colleagues occur and most likely
happen at a high rate. Moreover, courts remain reluctant
engage in the policing of intimate relationships. 83 Sexual
favoritism law may continue as a subset of sexual
harassment under Title VII in order to separate out weak
claims and reduce the number of claims. Yet, new sexual
harassment legislation provides the best option for
addressing the genuine issue at stake in a sexual favoritism
claim, discrimination based on sexual conduct.
IV. Conclusion
Ideally, the sexual favoritism law requires change in
order to give employees who witness severe sexual
favoritism in the workplace, either in isolated or
widespread scenarios, a claim against the employer. Sexual
favoritism law should not function as a subset of sexual
harassment under Title VII, because it has more to do with
sexual conduct rather than gender. However, the current
law may continue unaltered, considering the trend of cases
83 DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
17
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applying the EEOC Policy Guidance.
Nell Scovell's Late Night scenario creates a
challenge to concentrate on the severity of sexual
favoritism when determining if a plaintiff sustained a
legitimate claim. She struggled as a female writer in a male
dominated division who witnessed subordinates exercise
disproportional power, making her feel uncomfortable and
eventually forcing her to leave her dream job. A sole act of
favoritism may trigger an actionable response, because if
the sexual favoritism is severe, the inappropriate behavior
still delivers the wrong message to employees. Women, as
well as men, should not be subjected to such severe sexual
favoritism at work-a place where merit should determine
your success instead of sexual appeal.
18
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